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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NICK KIAHTIPES, DINO 
KIAHTIPES, and ANGELO 
KIAHTIPES, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Appel lants, 
MARIUS HENRY MILLS and 
MAXINE MILLS, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17528 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs against 
Defendants for specific performance of an agreement 
relating to real property located in Carbon County. 
Plaintiffs (buyers) sought specific performance from 
Defendants (sellers), reasonable attorneys' fees, and 
damages resulting from the inability to use the property 
for the raising of crops. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Initially the lower court entered summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants and against Plaintiffs. This 
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Court in Case No. 15998, 599 P.2d 508 (Utah 1979) reversed 
and remanded the matter for trial. 
A trial was held before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court sitting 
as a visiting judge, and judgment was entered by Judge 
Tibbs in favor of the defendants and against Plaintiffs. 
The court found that the agreement entered into by 
the parties was only preliminary, that the two conditions 
precedent required for it to go into effect had not been 
met, that there was a mutual mistake of fact, and that 
specific performance was therefore not warranted. Conse-
quently, the court entered its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and judgment (R. 145-150). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
judgment and an order granting specific performance to 
Plaintiffs together with reasonable attorneys' fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The large majority of facts in this case are undisputed. 
Most of the factual disputes arise as to certain conversa-
tions and events which transpired after the agreement was 
executed. This testimony will be examined in detail in the 
Argument portion of this Brief. Record citations will be 
omitted for all uncontroverted facts. 
Defendants Marius Henry Mills and Maxine Mills 
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own property in Carbon County located in the Miller Creek 
area. This property consists of the "Old Mills Farm" 
and the Angelo "Peperakis Farm." The total acreage of 
the Old Mills Farm and the Peperakis Farm is approximately 
515 acres. 
In addition, Defendants own other property in Duchesne 
county referred to as the "Nine Mile Area" Argyle Canyon 
Property consisting of approximately 2,600 acres. The 
defendants also own and maintain a steak house and lounge 
called the El Rancho in Price, Utah, as well as various 
livestock, machinery, and water stock in conjunction with 
their farming properties. 
In the latter part of 1976 Defendants were indebted to 
several financial institutions for money borrowed in the 
operation of the businesses. At that time the Federal Land 
Bank, the Utah Farm Production Credit Association (herein-
after referred to as "PCA"), Helper State Bank, and Walker 
Bank all claimed liens on assorted parcels of real property 
and items of personal property. 
In September of 1976 a conference was held in Provo, 
Utah, among the creditors to arrive at an accurate financial 
statement of the Mills' obligations and to agree on a concerted 
program to liquidate the existing obligations. It was 
decided that a further meeting should be held with the Mills 
and their attorney to discuss such a program. 
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On September 10, 1976, a further meeting was held in 
Price, Utah, among all of the creditors and with the Mills 
and their attorney Therald Jensen. The Mills agreed to 
sell all their cattle by the fall and to sell enough land 
and water stock to pay off the PCA obligation. 
Accordingly, in November of 1976 Defendants listed 
their farming property with Arms Realty Company through 
its agent, John r-1arsing. Two separate listings were made--
the first was the Miller Creek and Peperakis properties 
(the subject matter of this lawsuit) and the second was the 
Argyle Nine Mile property. The t·liller Creek property, 
however, excluded 60 acres which comprise the Mills' home-
stead, the same to be retained by Defendants. 
Interest was expressed by plaintiff Nick Kiahtipes 
approximately three months after the initial listing and 
at that time the property was shown to him. Kiahtipes 
stated that he did not think that he could use the whole 
property but would contact Mills later if he wished to 
purchase any part of it. 
Subsequently, Kiahtipes contacted Marsing and said 
he was interested in purchasing the Old Miller Creek and 
Peperakis property. 
Upon learning of Kiahtipes' interest, Mills testified 
he told Marsing that the only way an agreement could be 
reached would be to get the Federal Land Bank, PCA, Helper 
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State Bank and Walker Bank to decide if they would accept 
a sale agreement. (Tr. 211). Plaintiff Nick Kiahtipes 
testified that he was unaware of any Helper State Bank 
obligation secured by the property. (Tr. 99). 
After the Kiahtipes accepted the sales price for the 
property it was decided that Therald Jensen should draft 
an agreement between the parties. Jensen had represented 
the Mills for numerous years and had also done some legal 
work for the Kiahtipes. An appointment was arranged by 
Mr. Marsing, the real estate agent, for a meeting at which 
time the agreement was to be drawn. 
Prior to this meeting Mr. and Mrs. Mills in the company 
of Mr. Marsing went to both the PCA and the Federal Land Bank 
to propose that PCA as first lien holder receive the entire 
proceeds of the sale amounting to approximately $192,000 
in partial satisfaction of the PCA obligation. Mr. Loile 
Bailey of the PCA and Mr. Wayne Probst of the Federal Land 
Bank gave their preliminary approval to such agreement but 
stated they would both have to see the final form of sale 
agreement before actual approval could be made. 
While the real estate agent Marsing acknowledged that 
he was aware that there were liens by the four financial 
institutions, he stated that he did not know which liens 
went to the numerous parcels of property owned by Mills and 
that it was his understanding that only the Federal Land 
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Bank and the PCA directly concerned the property being 
purchased by Mr. Kiahtipes. (Tr. 56). Mr. Jensen, the 
attorney, stated that he prepared the agreement entirely 
upon the informations the parties had furnished him. (Tr. 
119). He stated he had no recollection at the time he 
drew the agreement as to which institutions had liens upon 
which property. He asserted that he was only told to worry 
about the Federal Land Bank and the PCA in drawing the 
agreement. (Tr. 136-137). 
A meeting was held at the office of Mr. Jensen in which 
the parties and Mr. Marsing attended. An agreement was 
subsequently prepared and the parties came back to Mr. 
Jensen's office on May 10 to execute the documents. 
The agreement is attached herein as an appendix. The 
provisions which Plaintiffs believe are pertinent to this 
appeal are paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 8, and 14. They state the 
following: 
3. The parties are aware of an outstanding 
first mortgage on the "Old Mills' Farm" held by 
the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, now known as 
the Federal Land Bank of Sacramento, as well as a 
first mortgage to the Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association of Salt Lake City, Utah on the "Angelo 
Peperakis' Farm" and all of the said water rights. 
The sellers have orally reported this sale to 
both of said corporations and have received an 
oral indication that if this contract is executed 
between the sellers and buyers, that the said 
Federal Land Bank will thereupon release its 
mortgage and that the said Utah Farm Production 
Credit Association will in writing, agree that 
when and if all the proceeds payable by the buyers 
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herein shall be paid to and applied on the 
indebtedness of sellers to said Association, 
that it will release its mortgage upon the said 
real property and water right. If within 
thirty (30) days from the execution of this 
agreement the Federal Land Bank should decline 
to release its mortgage or if the said Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association should decline 
to execute an agreement in writing agreeing to 
release its mortgage upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth, then this sales agreement between 
the sellers and buyers shall have no further force 
or effect. 
4. The said purchase price of One Hundred 
Ninety Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars 
($192,225.00) shall be paid as follows: Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) thereof shall be 
paid upon the obtaining of the said documents from 
said loaning institutions (which time is herein 
designated as the closing date) and the balance 
of said purchase price, namely, One Hundred Forty 
Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars 
($152,225.00) together with interest on the 
decreasing principal thereof at the rate of 
seven and one-half percent (7.5%) per annum 
reckoned from the said date of closing shall be 
paid in twelve (12) equal installments of principal 
in the sum of Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty 
Two and Eight Cents ($11,852.08) plus accrued 
interest on the tenth (10th) day of May of each year 
commencing with the year 1978. Commencing with 
the year 1981, buyers shall have the right to pay 
additional sums or the entire unpaid purchase 
price at their option. Possession shall be given 
at date of closing. 
7. At the time of closing sellers agree to 
make and execute to buyers a good and sufficient 
warranty deed to said real property and an assign-
ment of said water stock and to irrevocably 
deliver the same in escrow at the Zions First 
National Bank at Price, Utah, to be held by said 
bank and delivered to buyers at such time as they 
shall have bully paid said purchase price. 
8. Sellers, at their option, shall furnish 
either title insurance or an abstract of title 
on said real property. If sellers elect to furnish 
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an abstract of title, the last certificate of 
the same shall not be earlier than the date of 
this agreement and they agree to deliver the same 
to buyers for examination after which said abstract 
of title shall be left with said escrow holder and 
shall be finally delivered to buyers when they 
shall have fully paid such purchase price. If 
there are any defects in the title to said real 
property which render the same not marketable, 
sellers agree to remedy such defects at their 
cost and expense and within a reasonable time 
after being notified thereof by buyers. 
14. If either of the parties employs an 
attorney to enforce any of the provisions of 
this agreement or to pursue any remedy on account 
of the breach thereof, the losing party agrees to 
pay all court costs and a reasonable attorneys' 
fee. 
It was determined at trial that at the time the 
agreement was entered into the Federal Land Bank had a 
first mortgage on the Old Mills Ranch (one of the two 
parcels involved in this litigation) and a first mortgage 
on all of the property located in the Argyle Nine Mile Area. 
(Exhibit lSA). 
PCA had a first morggage on the Peperakis Farm (the 
second of the two parcels in this litigation) and a second 
mortgage on the Old Mills property. 
Helper State Bank had a second mortgage of $22,800 on 
the Peperakis property and on the Nine Mile property, and 
had a third mortgage on the Old Mills property and a third 
mortgage of $19,500 on the Peperakis property (Exhibit 15A). 
In summary, therefore, the Old Mills Ranch being 
purchased by Kiahtipes had a first mortgage by the Federal 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Land Bank, a second mortgage by PCA, and a third mortgage 
by Helper State Bank. The other property, the Peperakis 
Farm, had a first mortgage by PCA and a second and third 
mortgage to Helper State Bank (Exhibit 15A). 
On May 11, 1977, the Federal Land Bank sent a letter 
to Henry Mills stating "We would be willing to release from 
our mortgage that portion of the property which is known 
as the Old Mills Farm." It was conditioned upon the existing 
loan with the Federal Land Bank being kept current and all 
money of approximately $192,000 from the Kiahtipes sale 
being applied to the PCA loan. (Exhibit 2). No testimony 
was offered to suggest that the Federal Land Bank ever 
refused to comply with the terms of its offer to release its 
lien on the Old Mills Farm. 
Immediately after the May 10 agreement was signed Mr. 
Marsing, Henry Mills, and Maxine Mills met with Mr. Bailey 
of PCA and presented him a copy of the contract. At that 
time Mr. Bailey told the Mills that the agreement looked 
in order but that he would have to run it through the legal 
department to make sure it was properly prepared. Subse-
quently the legal department approved the transaction and 
the letter acknowledging this approval was sent to Henry 
Mills. The letter dated May 11, 1977, stated the following: 
The Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
has been informed of the above AGREEMENT by a copy 
thereof and the Association hereby agrees with, 
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and approves of the terms of the AGREEMENT with 
full proceeds of this sale ($192,225.00) plus 
interest accrued) paid directly to the Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association as outlined in 
paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of said agreement. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8). 
Mr. Mills acknowledged receiving both of these letters 
shortly after they were written. (Tr. 231, 233). 
In June and August proposals were made to the Federal 
Housing Administration by Defendants to refinance all of the 
debts on all of the Mills' property. However, no plan for 
FHA refinancing was discussed by Plaintiffs and Defendants 
incident to preparation of the agreement, and the agreement 
did not contemplate refinancing by Mills. A letter rejecting 
the first proposal for refinancing was sent to the Mills 
on June 22, 1977. (Exhibit 9). A letter rejecting the 
second proposal for refinancing was sent to the Mills on 
August 26, 1977. (Exhibit 10) . 
In the meantime, Mr. Kiahtipes took possession and had 
begun farming the property in dispute a few days after 
signing of the agreement, and had actually harvested two 
crops of hay. 
In September of 1977 Kiahtipes was, for the first time, 
informed by Mills that the agreement was not effective and 
that Kiahtipes must leave the property without harvesting 
the remaining crop of hay. Shortly thereafter this action 
was commenced. 
The preceding facts are, as previously mentioned, undis~U~ 
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:ei. 
The central arena of controversy in this case concerned 
whether the agreement had been complied with by the parties, 
whether Defendants were acting in good faith in subsequent 
attempts to put together new financial arrangements, and 
what conversations and events transpired after the agreement 
was signed. The testimony and evidence relating to these 
particular facets of the trial will now be discussed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Before reviewing the findings of the lower court and 
the evidence adduced at trial it is well to review the 
scope of this appeal. In equitable actions such as this 
suit for specific performance, this Court may review the 
facts and make an independent analysis of them. Creer 
v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978). And while the trial 
judge has considerable discretion in determining whether 
equity and good conscience require the relief granted, it 
is equally true that where the trial court has based its 
ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law and a correct interpretation may have produced a 
different result, the party adversely affected thereby is 
entitled to have the error rectified and a proper adjudi-
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cation under correct principles of law. Ferris v. Jennings, 
595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). 
Likewise, the rules of contractual construction are 
also pertinent. A contract should be interpreted so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions. An interpretation of a 
written contract is ordinarily a question of law and 
therefore this Court need not defer to the trial court's 
construction but will make its own independent interpreta-
tion of the contract terms. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 
(Utah 1980). 
The meaning and effect to be given to a contract 
depends upon the intent of the parties which is to be ascer-
tained by looking at the entire contract and all of its 
parts in their relationship to each other. Thomas J. 
Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products Inc., 515 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1973). 
Applying these principles of judicial review and 
contractal construction to the instant case results in the 
conclusion that the lower court erred in finding that the 
agreement entered into between the parties was not enforce-
able. 
The defendants contended that the agreement of May 10 
was merely preliminary and that it was conditioned upon 
obtaining an actual release of mortgage from the Federal Land 
Bank and an agreement by the PCA to subsequently release 
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its mortgage. Under Defendants' theory, after the agree-
ment was entered into it was "discovered" by Mr. Jensen, 
the drafter of the agreement, that Helper State Bank had 
junior mortgages on the two pieces of property. 
Even though both financial institutions had written 
letters approving the terms of the agreement, Defendants 
contended that the Helper State Bank lien in some fashion 
worked to revoke the consent of the two banks and that after 
subsequent meetings among the various institutions, Mr. 
Jensen, and Defendants, it was determined that the only 
way in which the Kiahtipes contract could be completed 
would be for a refinancing of the entire Mills estate. 
Defendants' theory then continues that efforts were 
made to obtain FHA financing but that they were rejected. 
Consequently it was necessary to abandon the contract since 
FHA would not refinance the entire Mills' indebtedness and 
PCA would not then agree to any arrangement that worsened 
its position. 
Defendants contended that Plaintiffs, through the 
realtor Jack Marsing and the attorney drawing the contract, 
Therald Jensen, were made aware of these problems throughout 
the summer, including the claim that the Helper State Bank 
lien was an obstacle preventing closing of the transaction. 
The lower court accepted this theory that Defendants 
presented as is evidenced by the Findings of Fact and Con-
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clusions of Law entered by the lower court. (R. 145-149). 
The court concluded that the conditions of the agree~ent 
were not met, that the transaction did not become a binding 
and final contract of sale, and that there was a mutual 
mistake of fact as to the existence of the Helper State Bank 
mortgage and the clearing of the transaction with creditors 
who had liens upon the land. Consequently no specific per-
formance was justified. (R. 148). 
Plaintiffs' theory of the events is considerably 
different. Plaintiffs contend that after the May 10 agree-
ment had been entered into, without question both the PCA 
and the Federal Land Bank gave written approval in the 
clearest terms to the transaction as required by paragraph 
3 of the agreement. The Federal Land Bank did not decline 
to release its mortgage as required by paragraph 3 of the 
agreement. On the contrary, it agreed so to do but no 
closing was yet scheduled for the instrument of release 
to be delivered. Likewise, the PCA agreed, in language 
substantially identical to the contract requirement, to 
release its interests if the proceeds of sale were turned 
over to it. 
Plaintiffs assert that the reason the transaction 
did not close was that they were never notified that PCA 
had approved the transaction, and in fact were misinformed 
by Mr. Mills throughout the summer that he was awaiting 
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PCA's approval and that until it came Mills' hands were 
tied. Plaintiffs further contend that any efforts made 
throughout the summer by Mr. Jensen, the drafter of the 
instrument, and Mr. Mills, was solely to refinance the 
entire debt structure of the Mills estate and was not for 
the purpose of completing the Kiahtipes-Mills contract. 
In fact, within 24 hours of the May 10, 1977 contract 
signing both PCA and Federal Land Bank had issued letters 
of approval to the defendants, and all that then remained 
to consumate the transaction according to its terms was 
to schedule a closing. Both lenders, however, refused to 
consent to new and different arrangements proposed by Mills, 
and negotiated by Therald Jensen, throughout the summer. 
Plaintiffs contended at trial that the Federal Land 
Bank and PCA never revoked their approval of these trans-
actions based upon the terms of the agreement, but only 
balked at terms in which extraneous negotiations were being 
attempted to refinance all of the Mills property. In 
other words, the attempt to refinance with FHA had nothing 
to do with completing the agreement but was something 
which Mills desired to do in order to avoid further pressure 
from other creditors. 
It was the position of Plaintiffs that the Helper State 
Bank liens were well known to Mills prior to the time of 
the agreement. There was no evidence that Kiahtipes, Marsing, 
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or Jensen were aware as to which liens went with which 
properties; Jensen and Marsing both relied upon Mills in 
describing the terms of the agreement. Additionally, 
since the Helper State Bank liens were behind PCA and 
the Federal Land Bank, the bank simply had no equity in 
those properties. 
If there was a Helper State Bank lien upon the property 
which was not specifically included in paragraph 3, 
Plaintiffs claim it was the obligation of Defendants to 
clear such lien pursuant to paragraph 8 of the agreement; 
in any event, Plaintiffs should have had the option to 
accept the property with the liens still existing on them. 
Put another way, Defendants should not be able to avoid the 
contract by reason of a condition the Defendants caused 
themselves, but Plaintiffs should have the right to never-
theless accept the contract (and property) subject to the 
condition. 
Appellants believe that the easiest way to illustrate 
the errors of the lower court is to contrast the lower court 
findings with the evidence contained in the record. In 
this manner a meaningful comparison can be made to determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the lower court 
finding. 
Appellants do not dispute Findings 1, 2 or 3 of the 
lower court findings. (R. 145-146). For example, there is 
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no doubt that over $200,000 was owed to the Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association and $20,000 was owed to the 
Federal Land Bank of Sacramento at the time of the execu-
tion of the agreement. 
Finding 4 is partially correct. Therald Jensen 
represented both parties at the time the agreement was 
drafted. Thereafter however, he worked entirely with 
defendant Mills inattempting to arrange a new deal, i.e., 
refinancing of the entire Mills estate which included 
numerous parcels of land not contained in the Kiahtipes-
Mills agreement. It cannot be said, therefore, that 
Jensen continued as Kiahtipes' attorney after the initial 
drafting had been completed. 
Finding No. 5 states that the Helper State Bank had 
mortgages in excess of $40,000 upon the land described in 
the agreement. The findings failed to note, however, 
that all of these mortgages were subordinate to both the 
Federal Land Bank and PCA. 
Finding No. 6 states the following: 
Soon after the execution by the parties of 
said preliminary agreement, a title report was 
obtained which disclosed the Helper State Bank 
mortgages and the said attorney representing 
both sellers and buyers participated in several 
meetings with creditors of the defendants 
in efforts to obtain an agreement from Helper 
State Bank to waive its rights to receive part 
of the purchase money as consideration for the 
partial release of its mortgage lien or to 
accept other securities for its indebtedness. 
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(R. 147). 
The only testimony concerning the alleged effort to 
have Helper State Bank release its second and third mort-
gages was given by Mr. Jensen, the attorney, and Mr. Stan 
Litizetti, an attorney for Helper State Bank. Mr. Jensen 
stated the following: 
Q. (By Mr. Martineau) Now, was Helper State 
Bank asked to release a lien on the Kiahtipes 
property and that is the property that was 
being sold to Kiahtipes? 
A. I don't recall that. 
Q. Do you recall them being asked to release a 
lien on the mountain land, that is, the range 
land, in connection with this refinancing 
arrangement that was being proposed and 
discussed. 
A. Well, at these meetings, I don't think they 
were asked that. They might have been; I 
don't remember that, but I don't think that 
was the object of the meetings was to come 
out and ask and come out and point the finger 
at them and say, "Now you release this one." 
There was a discussion as to what might be 
done, see. 
Q. Okay. It was a discussion of how Mr. Mills 
might be best preserved; is that right? 
A. Well, I don't know whether it was Mr. Mills' 
position but there was a discussion as to how 
these lending institutions could get their 
money. 
(Tr. 145-146). 
Mr. Litizetti, the attorney for Helper State Bank, 
testified that two meetings were held with Mr. Jensen and 
various other creditors in the sUTILmer of 1977. When asked 
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about the purpose of these meetings, however, his testimony 
revealed that the purpose was not to complete the Kiahtipes-
Mills contract but was rather to find a way to refinance 
all of Mills' estate. 
Q. (By Mr. Martineau) Stan, you didn't understand 
there was a potential sale between Kiahtipes 
and Mr. Mills at these meetings? 
A. At the time of the meeting in Therald's office? 
Q. Yes. 
A. ~. 
Q. You mentioned two meetings in Therald's office. 
At the second one you didn't understand that at 
all? 
A. I did not understand that at all. 
Q. Let me ask you this: Was Helper State Bank, 
to your knowledge, ever asked to release that 
mortgage with respect to the property that was 
being sold to Mr. Kiahtipes? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Did they ever ask Helper State Bank to release 
a lot of other properties in connection with 
this refinancing? 
A. Prior to that meeting? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Did they at that meeting? 
A. My notes do not disclose anything other than 
the whole agreement being to refinance with 
Farmers Home Administration. 
Q. Take everyone out? 
A. That's what my notes say, yes. 
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Q. But not with regard to the Kiahtipes-Mills 
transaction? 
A. No. I don't remember any relative releases 
as against Production Credit, Federal Land 
Bank, with the Helper State Bank. 
(Tr. 160-161) . 
This testimony clearly shows that no effort was made 
by Defendants or their attorney to release the Helper State 
Bank's second and third mortgages but that sole efforts 
were made to obtain a refinancing of all of the debts to 
all of the banks through the FHA. Such an effort was 
hardly in the best interest of Plaintiffs as to the 
completion of their contract dealing with only a small 
part of the total Mills Estate, and to bind Kiahtipes to 
the acts of Therald Jensen in attempting a refinancing 
would work an injustice. 
Finding No. 6 contained further erroneous statements: 
Such attorney also met with representatives 
of the Federal Land Bank and Production Credit 
Association to obtain partial releases of land to 
be substituted as security for the Helper State 
Bank indebtedness. Said attorney also made an 
effort to refinance all of the sellers' indebted-
ness to make effective and to close the said 
preliminary agreement. All of the efforts herein-
above referred to were in good faith for the 
purpose of meeting the conditions of the above-
quoted paragraph 3 of the agreement. 
This finding is supported by neither logic nor the 
evidence. It is clear from the court's own finding No. 2 
that Defendants owed Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
in excess of $200,000 which was secured by mortgages on the 
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land involved in the Kiahtipes sale. Since the proceeds 
of the sale were to be less than $200,000 the Helper State 
Bank lien as a second and third mortgage on the two parcels 
of property would have had no effect upon PCA receiving the 
proceeds. It clearly was not necessary to refinance all 
of the sellers' indebtedness in order to close the Kiahtipes 
deal. 
While admittedly Mr. Jensen characterized his efforts 
for refinancing as essential to consummate the Kiahtipes-
Mills contract, it was only so because Mr. Jensen had 
ignored that contract and was attempting to fulfill it as 
a part of the larger refinancing package. The testimony 
of all of the other officers of the bank relating to the 
purposes of the summer meetings pointed to refinancing, not 
completion of the original agreement. 
Mr. Litizetti, the attorney for Helper State Bank, 
testified that the Kiahtipes loan was not mentioned during 
the meetings and that he was not even aware that Kiahtipes 
was intending on purchasing any of the property. (Tr. 160-
161) . He stated that none of the bankers were willing to 
release anything without a totally agreed upon liquidation 
of all debts. He stated that the bankers would not give up 
their various positions as to all of the properties owned 
by Mills and therefore the only answer was to seek refinancing 
from the FHA. The Kiahtipes deal was never considered in 
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that meeting. (Tr. 159-160). 
Gerald Naylor, the office manager of PCA, stated that 
Jensen wished PCA to give up its first mortgage on 60 
acres of the Mills homestead plus all the range. He stated 
that Jensen wanted to do this so that Helper State Bank 
could have a mortgage on it. He replied that PCA was not 
in favor of any type of arrangement that would put it in 
a worse position than it was already in. (Tr. 183). 
Naylor specifically stated in his testimony that at 
no time prior to September of 1977 was he asked to approve 
the Kiahtipes transaction. Instead, PCA was asked to give 
up property such as the homestead interest which was not 
even included in the Mills-Kiahtipes agreement. Naylor 
stated unequivocably that if all of the proceeds of the 
contract went directly to PCA that he would still approve 
the sale on behalf of PCA. (Tr. 196-197). 
Finally, Mr. Loile Bailey who was the predecessor of 
Mr. Naylor stated that at the time he left the employment 
with PCA it was his understanding that PCA had approved the 
sale and it was just waiting for the paperwork to be com-
pleted. (Tr. 273). He further stated tnat at the time he 
allowed additional credit to Mills on the property he was 
aware of the Helper State Bank loan and at the time he 
approved the PCA package in his letter of May 11 he was 
also aware of the Helper State Bank interest. He stated 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that this did not affect his decision in approving the trans-
action. (Tr. 280). The evidence requires a finding that 
Defendants and their attorney, Therald Jensen, did not act 
in good faith in attempting to complete the Kiahtipes-Mills 
contract according to its terms but rather attempted a 
new way to solve the overall Mills problems. It was clearly 
in Mills' sole interest to attempt this refinancing of 
the entire estate and had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
property being sold to Kiahtipes. 
Finding No. 7 is also an incorrect statement of the 
legal requirement mandated by paragraph 3 of the agreement. 
Finding No. 7 states the following: 
No release of the Federal Land Bank mortgage 
was obtained as required by said paragraph 3 or at 
all and no unconditional agreement for release 
was obtained from the Production Credit Associa-
tion; that the letters, exhibits numbered 2 and 3 
did not meet the requirements of the above quoted 
paragraph 3; that all efforts to close the trans-
action for the sale of the land and the water 
stock by obtaining the documents from the loaning 
institutions as provided by the above-quoted 
paragraph 3 failed and no payments were made by 
the buyers to the sellers on the purchase price. 
No escrow arrangement was made at Zions First 
National Bank in Price or with any other bank 
or escrow holder and no deed and no endorsed 
certificates of stock were deposited with any 
escrow holder. 
(R. 147-148). 
This finding is clearly erroneous. It has been 
Plaintiffs' position throughout this lawsuit that the 
agreement is not ambiguous and does not require judicial 
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construction. Instead, it only remains to examine the 
language of paragraph 3 and the subsequent action taken 
by the lending institutions. Paragraph 3 of the agree-
ment basically boils down to the following pertinent 
language: 
If within 30 days from the execution of 
this Agreement the Federal Land Bank should 
decline to release its mortgage or if the said 
Utah Farm Production Credit Association should 
decline to execute an agreement in writing 
agreeing to release its mortgage upon the 
terms and conditions above set forth, then 
this sales agreement between the sellers and 
buyers shall have no further force or effect. 
(Emphasis added). (Exhibit 1) 
The Federal Land Bank did not decline to release its 
mortgage. The letter written to Mr. Mills dated .May 11, 
1977, by Wayne Probst, Manager of the Federal Land Bank, 
stated the following: 
This letter is written in confirmation 
of our mutual agreement made yesterday, May 10, 
in our office, that we would be willing to 
release from our mortgage that portion of the 
property which is known as the "Old Mills Farm." 
This Agreement to make the release at some 
future time, will have to comply with the then 
existing partial release policy of the bank. 
The release is contingent upon our loan being 
kept current and that all the monies, approxi-
mately $192,000 from the sale of this and the 
Peperakis farm are applied to your now existing 
debt to the Utah Farm Production Credit Associa-
tion. (Emphasis added). (Exhibit 2). 
Naturally, the mortgage itself was never actually 
released since the escrow account had not been set up and 
since no money had been paid over to PCA as required by 
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the Federal Land Bank. Defendants maintained that the 
actual release of mortgage was required in order to meet the 
requirements of paragraph 3. However, a reading of the entire 
agreement shows that the bank would not release its mortgage 
until the establishment of the escrow account pursuant to 
paragraphs 6 and 7 and that the mortgage release would be 
placed into that account along with the various other docu-
ments from PCA. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the 
contract to have expected the Federal Land Bank to give up 
its security interest in the property without being assured 
that PCA was going to receive the proceeds of an arms-length 
sale. There is no evidence in the record to show that the 
Federal Land Bank ever repudiated this agreement to release 
its mortgage at the appropriate time. 
Likewise, PCA executed an agreement in writing agreeing 
to release its mortgage. In a letter dated May 11, 1977 to 
Mr. Mills from Loile Bailey the following statements were 
made: 
Reference is made to that certain agreement 
entered into on the 10th day of May, 1977, by and 
between M. Henry Mills and Maxine Mills, his wife, 
sellers and Nick Kiahtipes, Dino Kiahtipes, and 
Angelo Kiahtipes, buyers. 
The Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
has been informed of the above agreement by a 
copy thereof and the Association hereby agrees 
with, and approves of the terms of the agreement, 
with full proceeds of this sale ($192,225 plus 
interest accrued) paid directly to the Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association as outlined in para-
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graphs 3, 4 and 6 of said agreement. 
8). 
(Exhibit 
As before, the defendants did not show that this 
agreement relating to the specific transaction referred to 
in the agreement had been rescinded or repudiated by PCA 
and, in fact, the testimony of Mr. Naylor, the successor 
of Mr. Bailey, indicated that such transaction as outlined 
in the original agreement would be honored. (Tr. 196-197). 
The fact that PCA would not agree to give up its 
mortgage on the land not involved in this sale, or substitute 
Helper State Bank in its place as to land involved in the 
sale so that Defendants could refinance the entire structure 
of their indebtedness, does not in any way affect the condi-
tions as outlined in paragraph 3 of the agreement. Plaintiffs 
did not agree that refinancing was a condition to their 
purchase and therefore cannot be held accountable for 
Defendants' unsuccessful efforts to obtain this goal. 
The record shows unequivocably that the terms as out-
lined in paragraph 3 of the agreement were immediately and 
precisely met by the banking institutions. The only reason 
that a closing did not occur was the failure by Defendants 
to notify Plaintiffs that PCA had given its written approval 
and because of Defendants' subsequent assertion that no PCA 
approval could be obtained. 
Even Mr. Marsing, Defendants' own real estate agent, 
w~s never told of the PCA approval letter of May 11. He 
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stated he had never seen the letter from Mr. Bailey, 
Exhibit 3, until after the lawsuit was filed. (Tr. 36). 
He stated that when he talked to Mills on several occasions 
and asked him what was holding up the deal Mills indicated 
that PCA had not given its approval and that he could not 
force their hand. He said, "My hands are tied. I can't 
force the issue." (Tr. 42). 
Nick Kiahtipes, the plaintiff in this case, stated 
that he never received a letter written by Mr. Bailey to 
him concerning the approval of the PCA. (Exhibit 3). He 
stated that he never saw this letter until after the lawsuit 
was filed and a copy was obtained by his counsel. (Tr. 79). 
In fact, the original document was obtained from Defendants' 
own legal files. 
Kiahtipes was told in September by Mills to leave the 
premises and not to cut the third crop of hay since PCA 
would not accept the contract. Kiahtipes stated that Mills 
also said he had changed his mind about selling and the 
deal was off. (Tr. 81). 
Mills stated that to his knowledge a release by PCA 
was never obtained. (Tr. 219). He admitted telling Kiahtipes 
to get off his land because PCA would not give a release. 
(Tr. 222). He also admitted receiving the letter from Mr. 
Bailey of May 11 notifying him of PCA's approval. (Tr. 
231). 
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Essentially, as a matter of law, both the Federal Land 
Bank and the PCA were willing to release their liens upon 
the property after the appropriate escrows and payments 
had been made. The 30-day requirement of paragraph 3 
related only to notification by the two organizations as 
to whether they were willing to release their liens. 
There is nothing contained in the agreement stating when 
the closing was to occur. Thus, the 30-day time limit 
related only to extinguishing the two conditions precedent, 
namely, the approval by PCA and the Federal Land Bank to 
release their interests. After they had so agreed the 
closing could have occurred any time as provided for in 
paragraph 8. 
A review of the evidence shows that the Helper State 
Bank lien existing upon the property subject to sale had 
no effect whatsoever upon this transaction. Since the sale 
to Kiahtipes was clearly an arms-length transaction and 
no contention is made that the purchase price was not a fair 
value for the property, it is clear that the Helper State 
Bank second and third mortgages on the Peperakis property 
and its third mortgage on the Old Mill property would never 
have come into effect and Helper State Bank would have 
received nothing as a junior mortgagor. The use of the 
Helper State Bank lien as an excuse was solely for the 
purpose of avoiding the sale and in attempting to arrange 
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a refinancing of all of the debts owed by Mills to the 
various institutions. 
In addition, if the Helper State Bank liens were in 
fact a problem it was for Kiahtipes, not Mills, to elect 
what remedy should be pursued. In other words, since the 
Helper State Bank lien was not listed as a condition prece-
dent in the agreement it merely amounted to a title defect 
and under the provisions of paragraph 8 the sellers were 
obligated to remedy such defects at their own cost and expense 
within a reasonable time after being notified. 
If Kiahtipes wished to take the property with the 
Helper State Bank lien still in effect it was his privilege 
to do so. The purpose of clearing title is obviously for 
the buyer and not for the seller. This court in Eliason v. 
Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), recognized this principle 
as follows: 
The failure to obtain a permit does 
not deprive defendant of any valuable right. 
The provision was added to the contract by 
plaintiffs, and the condition was clearly for 
their benefit in putting the property to its 
desired use. It was the plaintiffs who were 
entitled to demand the benefit of that con-
dition, and if they choose to waive the 
condition it was within their power to do so. 
Id. at 430. 
Also, as stated by this Court in Huck v. Hayes, 560 
P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977), "It is fundamental that a party to 
a contract should obtain no advantage from the fact that 
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he is himself unable to perform." The Huck case also 
notes that a buyer is not obligated to pay or tender 
money or property until such time as the seller produces 
good title and that the furnishing of such title "was a 
condition precedent to his right to demand payment from 
the purchaser." Id. at 1126. 
The Huck case is also similar as to the motivations 
which Mills in this case had in failing to close the 
transaction. In Huck this Court stated: 
The evidence justified the view taken by 
the trial court that the negotiations between 
the parties indicated an onqoing intent to carry 
out the contract as soon as the hereinabove 
mentioned title difficulties had been remedied; 
and that the defendant, for reasons of his own, 
had apparently changed his mind and attempted to 
assert deficiencies for which he was himself 
responsible to avoid going through with the 
deal. Id. at 1126. 
Since there is no evidence to justify how the Helper 
State liens could have possibly precluded PCA or the Federal 
Land Bank from agreeing to the releases of its mortgage it 
must be assumed that the claim of the lien was a "red 
herring" for the purpose of allowing Mills the opportunity 
to seek another solution to his problems. Furthermore, 
that excuse appears to have first been used after the PCA 
excuse failed for lack of factual basis. Mr. Marsing, the 
real estate agent retained by Mills, stated that in a 
conversation he had with Mrs. Mills in September of 1977 
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she stated that the deal wasn't going to go through since 
the Mills had found another avenue of money. She said 
they could now sell the water stock for more than the total 
sales price of the listing and yet still be able to retain 
their land. (Tr. 39). This testimony was corroborated 
by Mr. Naylor, the officer at PCA, who stated that in 
September Mills told him he wanted to sell his water stock 
and keep the ranch and not sell it to Kiahtipes. (Tr. 188). 
Thus, not only did Defendants fail to inform Plaintiffs 
of the PCA approval which is required before any condition 
precedent can be relied upon, Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976), but also the Mills failed to act in 
good faith with regard to the agreement and failed to cooperate 
so that the agreement could be performed. Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 
612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1979). 
The conclusions of law entered by the trial court were 
erroneous since they were based upon erroneous factual 
assumptions as contained in the Findings of Fact. However, 
Conclusion of Law No. 2 also stated: 
There was a mutual mistake of fact as to 
the existence of the Helper State Bank mort-
gage and the clearing of the transaction 
with creditors who had liens upon the land 
and water stock described in the preliminary 
agreement. 
(R. 148). 
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It is fundamental that evidence to sustain mutual 
mistake of fact must be clear, definite and convincing. 
Eliason v. Johnson, 523 P.2d 647 (Utah 1967). The only 
possible mistake of fact which could be referred to in 
this Conclusion is the failure of the parties to include 
the Helper State Bank in the agreement. However, the 
evidence is clear that only Mills at the time of the 
agreement was aware of the obligations each financial 
institution had upon the various parcels of land. Neither 
Jensen, Marsing, nor Kiahtipes were aware of the breakdown, 
nor particularly cared if it didn't affect the sale. If 
any mistake was made, therefore, in omitting the Helper 
State Bank lien from the conditions it was made entirely 
by Mr. Mills. Such "mistake" was not raised until after 
Mills decided not to sell, was not attempted to be rectified 
in good faith, and amounted to an immaterial matter since 
the Helper State Bank didn't have any equity in the properties 
anyway. 
Even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that 
Kiahtipes was aware of the Helper State Bank liens this 
still did not create a mutual mistake. In fact, it would 
show that the parties were aware of the lien but specifically 
excluded it from the agreement as a condition precedent. 
Thus, such knowledge would show not mutual mistake of fact, 
but an exclusion of the Helper State Bank lien as an element 
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upon which the agreement was conditioned. The finding of 
"mutual mistake" by the trial court is therefore unsupported 
by the findings previously entered by the court and by any 
evidence in the record itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case demonstrates the classic example 
of an instance where a seller enters into a deal with a 
buyer, and subsequently changes his mind because of a new 
profit opportunity and attempts to avoid the transaction. 
Here, the agreement was clear that only PCA and the Federal 
Land Bank had to approve the releasing of mortgages upon 
receipt by PCA of all the proceeds of sale. The approvals 
were in fact agreed to and only awaited a vehicle to 
implement them, i.e., an escrow or closing of some kind to 
consummate the sale. 
Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs, or even their 
own real estate agent, of the approvals and attempted a 
new course of action to refinance the entire Mills estate 
and debt structure. Mills, together with his attorney, 
Jensen, pursued throughout the summer a course that ignored 
the contract but attempted to solve larger problems of Mills 
without reference to the original Kiahtipes transaction. 
The testimony of the bank attorney was that Helper State 
Bank was never asked to release its liens upon the Kiahtipes-
Mills property; on the contrary, that PCA and the Federal 
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Land Bank were asked to release their respective interests 
in property which was not even involved in the Kiahtipes-
Mills sale. 
As the refinancing effort became fruitless, Defendants 
then discovered they could sell their water stock which had 
risen greatly in value and still retain their land. At 
that time, they evicted Kiahtipes from the property using 
the excuse that PCA would not cooperate. 
While the true motives of Defendants in refusing to 
perform can only be inferred from the facts, it is the only 
logical assumption based upon the various positions of 
the institutions and the parcels of land which they encumbered. 
There is no showing in the record whatsoever that the Helper 
State Bank liens could have had any effect upon the sale to 
Kiahtipes since the market value of the property would not 
even satisfy the prior liens of PCA and the Federal Land 
Bank, thereby precluding Helper State Bank from being 
able to assert any type of interest. 
For the foregiong reasons, therefore, this Court, as 
a court of equity, should carefully review the evidence 
in this case and should reverse the decision of the lower 
court, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and award 
attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs based upon the evidence 
adduced at trial for the efforts required to enforce the 
agreement. 
-34-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted, 
Reed L. Martineau 
A. Dennis Norton 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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